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Abstract 
In the past, airports relied on a host of information systems 
and control applications that were loosely integrated.   The 
software infrastructure components that supported water, 
heating and lighting systems did not exchange data with 
baggage handling applications, nor with air traffic 
management systems.  In turn, these infrastructures were 
isolated from information systems to aid passenger 
movements through check-in to departures and onto the 
aircraft. Many airports have, however, begun to implement 
Airport Operations Plans that improve situation awareness 
and support collaborative optimisation through increased 
levels of integration and connectivity.   This paper identifies 
different architectures that support a new generation of 
Airport Operations Centres (APOC).   Subsequent sections 
summarise the cyber security threats that arise from inter-
connection and inter-dependence.   The closing paragraphs 
present mitigations that increase the cyber resilience of 
APOCs and also address a number of associated safety 
concerns.  
 
1 Introduction 
Airports have traditionally focussed on physical security.  
Policies and procedures ensure the separation of airside and 
landside operations.    Sensing devices have been deployed to 
identify unauthorised attempts to cross this divide.   The 
architecture of airports has evolved with physical barriers to 
prevent attacks similar to that on Glasgow airport in 2007 or 
in Brussels during 2016.   These security mechanisms impose 
considerable costs in terms of direct investment but also in 
terms of delays and inconvenience for the travelling public 
[1,2].   At the same time, airports have become more 
interconnected [3].   Increasingly complex software systems 
merge information from, and provide information to, a host of 
stakeholders including the airlines but also security service 
providers, facilities management teams and infrastructure 
subcontractors [4].   This helps optimise throughput for traffic 
mix and the consequent requirements for baggage handling, 
for infrastructure support and for physical security screening.  
Some airports monitor meteorological information and use 
this data to plan for the knock-on effects of delays and 
cancellations.  There are growing interconnections with Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). Partly in 
consequence, the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) has developed the Airport Network information 
eXchange Model (ANXM), based on ICAO Annex 14 and 
Doc 4444, enabling the digital exchange of airport 
information at local, regional, national and international 
levels [5].  In consequence, airport operations now depend on 
the close coupling of heterogeneous software systems 
exchanging data over network architectures.   The previous 
focus on the physical security of staff and passengers is now 
shifting to consider a range of cyber-related threats.  These 
have the potential to interrupt airport operations and threaten 
safety – by disrupting critical services.  They may also help 
facilitate physical attacks if attacks compromise the integrity 
of the screening systems used by security staff. 
2. Total Airport Management 
The SESAR European programme for the modernisation of 
Air Traffic Management has promoted the concept of Total 
Airport Management (TAM), reflecting the evolution towards 
a performance-based ATM system. The notion of 
performance management is therefore the cornerstone of the 
future airport concept, which foresees an integrated airport 
management framework. The airport operations management 
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concept relies on the creation and maintenance of an Airport 
Operations Plan (AOP) as the single, common and 
collaboratively agreed rolling plan used by all involved 
stakeholders at an airport [6].  This helps optimise flow 
management of airport demand against existing and future 
capacity. Airport Demand Capacity Balancing (A-DCB) must 
be robust against a host of complex, dynamic constraints 
including the availability of aircraft stands, the impact of 
weather, as well as noise and environmental restrictions.  The 
airport in the concept can be seen as a ground sector of the 
ATM Network which will be achieved through the full 
integration of AOPs with the NOP (Network Operations 
Plan), supported by SWIM (System Wide Information 
Management).  
The aim of TAM is to steer, monitor, manage and perform 
post analysis of airport performance. It relies on an airport 
performance framework based in agreed and refined key 
performance indicators and airport performance targets.   This 
integrates landside functions, facilitating passengers and 
cargo operations, with the airside functions that handle 
aircraft on the ground but also during arrival and departure. 
The scope of TAM also covers other aspects that may 
influence the overall airport performance such as transport 
networks (road access, rail, metro, car parks, etc.), critical 
networks (electricity, telecom, fuel, etc.) and meteorological 
aspects. Collaborative decision-making will be optimised 
through robust and predictive monitoring tools, what-if 
decision support tools, self-learning business intelligence and 
user-defined performance dashboards.  Benefits include 
increased predictability and resilience of operations, greater 
pro-activity and efficiency to cope with both nominal and 
adverse conditions. In order to support collaborative decision 
making, it is important to provide an underlying concept of 
operations and architecture for distributed and scalable 
information management across these complex socio-
technical systems.  
TAM objectives are delivered through an AirPort Operations 
Centre (APOC), as the heart of airport performance. It is a 
platform / operational structure which pro-actively manages 
the performance of present and short-term airport operations, 
giving relevant airport stakeholders a common operational 
overview of the airport, and allowing them to communicate, 
coordinate and collaboratively decide on their progress.  It is 
intended to monitor airport performance and help identify 
situations that require operator intervention in response to 
external events, including bad weather but also disruptions 
across complex, integrated supply chains.   APOC operations 
must: 
• Maintain performance during nominal conditions, 
degraded modes and recovery, especially when this 
involves cooperation between the airport and air 
traffic network management;  
• Encourage and sustain collaborative information 
sharing and cooperative procedures in the planning 
of routine, atypical and adverse operations. 
 
– Help real-time recover management in response to 
adverse weather and ‘exceptional’ operating 
conditions; 
A number of different approaches have been taken to the 
physical implementation of APOCs.   For example, a scalable 
APOC has been implemented at Paris Charles De Gaulle 
airport supported by digital integration and information 
exchange between distributed teams that are not located 
within the same control room.  Depending on the situation, 
the APOC can be reconfigured to cover airport stakeholders' 
need and situations, linking with airport centralised functions 
and command centres (parking and access, terminals, airside 
operations, de-icing) and with police, customs, Grouped ADP 
headquarters, civil aviation authority (French DGAC).  As an 
example, 68 disruptive situations were pro-actively managed 
in 2014 (storms, strong wings, strikes, technical failures etc.) 
in Paris Charles de Gaulle APOC, limiting the impact on their 
customers and preventing these disruptions to escalate in 
crises. This approach offers a flexible and cost-effective 
solution.   In contrast, Heathrow opened a bespoke APOC in 
2014 where airlines, the ANSP NATS, the UK Border Force, 
the Metropolitan Police and the Highways Agency all sit 
within the same control room.  
The benefits and challenges of TAM can be illustrated 
through recent validation exercises for Time Based 
Separation (TBS) at Heathrow.  Aircraft during final 
approach are routinely expected to maintain fixed separation 
minima this distance is intended to ensure that following 
aircraft do not encounter the wake vortex of preceding flights.   
However, strong headwinds will reduce the ground speed of 
an aircraft on final approach leading to a reduced landing rate 
with delays and cancellations.  TBS reduces the separation 
between aircraft because stronger winds will help dissipate a 
wake vortex.  Initial trials have shown that TBS could allow 
up to five extra aircraft per hour in strong wind conditions, 
and reduce holding times up to 10 minutes at Heathrow. 
However, safe landing rates are also determined by the 
aircraft’s final approach speed and deceleration profile.  In 
consequence, the use of such optimisation techniques will 
only succeed if the landside infrastructures are tuned to 
respond to changing traffic patterns.  Stakeholders must work 
together to ensure that stands are available, that ground 
handlers are ready and that outbound aircraft are prepared to 
make use of the available departure slots.  
 
3.  The Challenge of TAM Cyber Security 
The interconnectivity of airport operations increases concerns 
over cyber-security [7]. Many of the initiatives, cited in 
previous sections, focus on cost reduction not information 
integrity.  In consequence, the associated protocols and 
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networks are vulnerable.   Many are unauthenticated and 
some existing traffic is unencrypted.   
There are important differences between airport operations 
and more conventional safety-related applications.   In 
particular, there are cyber-physical threats where an attack on 
information infrastructures can expose or leverage 
vulnerabilities in physical security.   For example, 
undermining the integrity of digital systems can be used to 
compromise the level or protection offered by CCTV 
installations and access control cards.  These concerns are not 
‘science fiction’.   A recent attack on information systems in 
Antwerp was able to hide the importation of drug and 
weapons through the port [8]. 
Cyber security concerns for Total Airport Management 
extend well beyond the conventional enterprise architectures 
that characterise many other information systems.   Airports 
are unusual because they also integrate Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS)/ Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) infrastructures. Power, heat and lighting 
distribution also rely on relatively low-level sensors and 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) rather than 
conventional mass-market processors. Automated, baggage-
handling systems are controlled by similar devices that 
operate over Profibus and Modbus rather than TCP/IP.  
SCADA devices are vulnerable because most were designed 
and deployed in an era before cyber security was an explicit 
concern for system procurement.   An attack on PLCs and 
sensors controlling air conditioning units would undermine 
higher-level enterprise information systems and the digital 
interfaces to physical security networks. 
 
TAM concepts must also consider a host of safety concerns 
that do not arise from the cyber-security of many more 
conventional office-based systems.   For example, APOC 
stakeholders include representatives of local ATC and 
airspace users who ensure the safe and efficient movement of 
aircraft on taxiways and runways.   Their performance affects 
all other aspects of the APOC hence there is a need to 
integrate data from their applications with the wider 
information ecosystem.  Many of the software tools used by 
the Tower crew are safety-related, for instance, controlling 
sectional lighting to help coordinate aircraft movement.   It is 
conceivable that some cyber threats might trigger loss of life, 
by exploiting vulnerabilities in the sectional taxiway lighting 
systems.   However, system diversity and human monitoring 
make this relatively unlikely – aircrew and Tower personnel 
will notice abnormal behaviour.   However, other concerns 
focus on denial of service (DoS) attacks. Traditionally, these 
overwhelm network components with spurious requests.   In 
safety-critical systems, operators will intervene to halt a 
service if they suspect that it has been the target of an attack.  
For instance, Tower staff will reduce traffic and eventually 
close the skies if they cannot trust the integrity of data from 
arrivals and departure management. 
 
 
4. Potential Attackers? 
 
As mentioned in previous sections, this paper summarises the 
initial phase of a cyber security threat assessment for the 
TAM concept of operations.   Some airport stakeholders still 
question whether anyone would deliberately target the 
infrastructures that they operate.   This attitude is gradually 
fading as more information is disseminated in the aftermath 
of STUXNET, DUQU, the Ukrainian attacks etc. There is a 
growing awareness of the range of potential attackers with an 
interest in disrupting airport operations, these include but are 
not limited to: 
 
• Individual hackers - the intellectual interest and 
potential for personal gain by being associated with 
such a global and high-profile mode of 
transportation; 
• (H)activists - local and policy interests in the 
environmental, safety and economic factors of 
aviation are high, with the European dimension 
giving added interest; 
• Insiders (employees, contractors, etc.) -  the trusted-
insider-turned-attacker is always concerning simply 
due to their level of authorised access. With TAM, 
increasing collaboration and industrialisation means 
more contract engineers having more access, and 
individual circumstances or events (sometimes 
linked with broader factors such as tough economic 
times) can lead to them posing a threat; 
• Business competitors - those seeking a competitive 
advantage through industrial espionage of 
technologies, operational insight, business plans, etc, 
can pose a threat; 
• Terrorists: as aviation has long been the target of 
serious and symbolic attacks, and the public is 
already sensitive to safety fears, terrorists could aim 
to attack through solely cyber-means, or perhaps are 
more likely to use sensitive information obtained 
through a cyber-attack to launch a more 
conventional attack such as a hijacking or bombing 
based on the cyber-physical scenarios identified in 
previous paragraphs 
• Organised crime- the sheer costs of cancelling or 
disrupting flights could elicit financial reward if held 
to ransom, or through the theft of intellectual 
property.   Airports are also centres for a host of high 
high-value operations – ranging from commercial 
on-site operations through to the transport and 
storage of cargo items; 
• State cyber-forces: any country’s airport 
infrastructure is an important economic and social 
target, as well as being a critical national 
infrastructure and potentially a means to achieve 
geo-political advantage, particularly during times of 
high regional tensions. Disruption to hub airports 
would have an impact not only on local business but 
also in many countries macro prosperity. 
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The distinctions between these different groups are blurred – 
for example, terrorist groups might leverage an attack using 
zero day exploits that can be purchased from criminal peer to 
peer networks.   Groups such as ISIL have trained airport 
engineers within their territories; these individuals have the 
knowledge necessary to leverage future threats so that they 
resemble an insider attack [9]. 
 
  
5. Cyber-Strengths and Vulnerabilities 
 
The particular vulnerabilities of an APOC depend on the 
technologies used, on their deployment and operation as well 
as associated maintenance.   However, like many aspects of 
both the US NextGen and European SESAR movement, 
TAM creates a common set of concerns: 
  
• New attack propagation vectors: The increased 
number of interconnections between TAM 
stakeholders and between business and operational 
systems increases the attack surface and creates new 
attack propagation vectors. Cyber-attack payloads 
could be propagated across common services; 
• Increased level of exposure: The use of open public 
internet network may be chosen by stakeholders as 
low-entry means of communication and thus might 
increase the level of exposure of particular 
components within an APOC; 
• Increased transactions: Whereas limited data is 
exchanged today between some APOC components 
and between stakeholders across Europe, the 
implementation of TAM will drastically increase the 
number of data types exchanged between 
stakeholders in support of CDM. More opportunities 
will be offered to attackers to alter the integrity of 
multiple data types; 
• Possibilities of multi-target cyber-attacks: Openness 
and net-centric architecture create opportunities for 
multiple, coordinated cyber-attacks enabling more 
systemic or European-wide impacts, especially with 
APOC architectures supporting multiple airport 
operators; 
• Publication of vulnerabilities: Whether explicitly 
through Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) or through public leaks of common 
vulnerabilities in APOC components such as the 
SWIM protocols and communications stacks may 
facilitate attack planning and design; 
• Varying levels of cyber-security maturity across the 
numerous APOC stakeholders’ may create weak 
links in the cyber-security supply chain. 
 
Conversely, the development of TAM concepts and their 
delivery through APOC architectures also provides 
opportunities for mitigation: 
 
• Cyber-security coordination that improves the 
sharing of information (risk assessments, 
vulnerabilities assessments, threat assessments, etc) 
and provides coordinated incident response.  This is 
particularly important between APOCs across 
Europe but also within the stakeholders of TAM.  
Depending on the nature of an incident, it will be 
important to coordinate forensic support and 
available resources to aid recovery; 
• Coordinated approach or security management.   
APOCs and the associated management structures 
help to pool resources and to ensure that all partners 
meet their obligations – for instance, in ensuring the 
application of security patches; 
• Standardised interfaces for services, in particular, for 
security applications to reduce the potential for 
abuse and subversion.  More specifically common 
formats support the use of whitelist intrusion 
detection which relies on network and systems 
managers being able to recognise valid processes; 
• Sharing with other sectors fixes, advances and 
investments in cyber-security for COTS components.  
A key concern with the development of APOC 
infrastructures is to benefit from economies of scale 
and move away from high-cost bespoke applications; 
• Reducing complexity and overheads, thereby 
reducing mistakes and unauthorised configurations.  
This is important because, typically, the more 
security features that are embedded within a system 
then the more important it is to ensure that they are 
correctly configured when deployed within an 
airport environment. 
 
Particular implementation architectures also offer particular 
benefits for cyber-security.  For example, the use of 
virtualised or service oriented APOC architectures means that 
application processes can be clustered on common servers.  
Redundancy and diversity can then be used to increase the 
resilience of centralised computational resources.   It is 
arguably easier to manage the cyber-security of these 
implementations than ensure thousands of distributed 
machines are correctly configured and patched across airport 
infrastructures.   Other APOC infrastructures, associated with 
SCADA components cannot be virtualised in this way.  In 
such situations there is a tension between the use of ‘air gaps’ 
that isolate PLCs and sensors from networked attacks and the 
need to enable ICS integration with the TAM concept of 
operations.    
 
 
6.  Cyber Threat Scenarios 
 
Previous sections have argued that cyber risk assessments for 
Total Airport Management must consider an evolving range 
of potential attackers.  It is also important to take a balanced 
approach to both the strengths and the weaknesses derived 
from APOC architectures as we move from basic research to 
initial deployment [10].   Scenarios and use cases provide 
important tools in this work.  The intention is not to 
enumerate every possible cyber threat to airport 
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infrastructures.  Instead, the aim is to expose existing 
vulnerabilities that can have a credible impact on safe and 
successful operation.   They provide a focus for discussion 
between multiple stakeholders and across national borders.  
The following paragraphs present an initial subset of these 
TAM scenarios. 
 
6.1 Unauthorised Disclosure of Operational Data 
 
In this scenario, an activist group is campaigning against the 
expansion of an airport. Their aim is to highlight 
environmental damage by launching a cyber-attack on the 
APOC information systems.  They use a spear-phishing attack 
on junior airport management that is then used to leverage 
access to the long and medium term planning data held within 
an APOC.  The hackers begin to selectively exfiltrate a range 
of sensitive information – this includes personal details about 
airport staff home addresses so that they can become targets 
for direct action. They place company financial information 
on externally facing web sites; revealing data about the 
financial remuneration of key staff and also the sums paid to 
sub-contractors.   
 
The activists export data about the airport’s environmental 
impact – including the violation of night curfews.   By 
identifying high-level APOC KPIs, the compromised systems 
yield safety performance data that is leaked to media and 
regulatory organisations. The activists find evidence of 
situations where minimum separations were violated over 
densely populated areas on approach or departure – 
threatening the communities that play a key role in the future 
expansion of the airport.   Their analysis is missing many 
elements (e.g. air-ground data-link and radio communication 
records) to provide a distorted but plausible story, which is 
amplified on social media.  Politicians and the public begin to 
question stakeholders about the cyber-security of APOC 
operations.  The material is reformatted to undermine 
confidence in the airport and, especially to stress the apparent 
lack of cyber-security in an organisation that plays an 
important role in the preservation of public safety. 
 
6.2 Ransomware Attacks through the Supply Chain 
 
In the second scenario, the pressure for improved productivity 
alienates a software engineer at a major APOC systems 
supplier.  They are rushing to meet a deadline and breaking 
company policy, decide to integrate unattributed source code 
from a public repository into their modules.  Time pressures 
mean that this is not identified during Verification and 
Validation.  In any case, their company will only use 
independent reviews for safety critical software. Months later 
when integrated into an operational system, code that is 
hidden within the public source is now executed.  The 
malware is modelled on the attack vector that was embedded 
within STUXNET.  Initially it does nothing.  However, after 
some days it begins to send corrupted packets onto shared 
network infrastructures.   The intention is not to force a 
collapse or to launch a DoS attack but to undermine 
confidence in the engineers from several sub-contractors who 
must diagnose the source of the problem.  The APOC 
implementation is not designed to support forensic analysis 
nor are the engineers trained to consider anything other than 
more routine bugs.   The malware then hides itself by halting 
any network communication.  Engineers fail to find the cause 
of the problem and normal operations are resumed – hence 
there is a huge loss of confidence when the problem returns 
again some time later.  This leads to massive disruption, 
undermining trust in the APOC and the associated ATM 
systems. There are calls for root-to-branch review of critical 
code but there is insufficient expertise available to do this and 
the APOC is not supported by sufficient logging or by the 
necessary IPR agreements to identify the source of the 
problem.   
 
A variant on this scenario is that instead of consuming critical 
resources such as network bandwidth, the hidden code might 
attack configuration data.  This would again undermine the 
stability of the APOC.  Without appropriate recovery 
mechanisms it might take a significant amount of time to 
detect and diagnose the cause of the problem.  Another 
observed method of attack focuses on the integration of VOIP 
communications into APOC architectures.  Previous attackers 
have introduced code that either jams all communications 
within the APOC by mass calling of their numbers or incurs 
huge financial costs by using the internal VOIP code to place 
unintended premium calls on behalf of the APOC 
stakeholders. 
 
The motivation for this attack might be financial gain through 
the increasing prevalence of sophisticated and embedded 
ransomware.  APOC stakeholders would continue to suffer 
until either they found the source of the malware embedded in 
the sub-contractors code or transferred ledger-based payment.  
 
6.3 Advanced Persistent Threats 
A third scenario focuses on a dispute between two 
neighbouring states. This leads to sanctions being imposed, 
which exacerbates tensions and triggers further reactions. Not 
wanting to provoke a military response, an antagonistic 
cyber-attack campaign is planned.  This is focussed on high-
value infrastructure operations; including power distribution 
but also the major airports.   The antagonist has access to 
engineers and technicians who have been trained by the same 
suppliers as the other APOC operators.   However, they have 
been combined into the offensive arm of the nation’s 
intelligence agencies with the remit to first map out and then 
potentially exploit weaknesses in cyber infrastructures. 
 
The antagonists have access to a national testbed for SCADA 
systems and the associated sensing devices.   They are then 
able to mimic aspects of the Ukrainian attack, cited earlier, 
for instance infecting the firmware on ICS components 
without being detected on the field devices that are used 
throughout the airport.   In this case, the application of 
conventional security management practices means that 
maintenance teams act in a rigorous manner to upload the 
infected malware through system patches even on air gapped 
devices.  Initial tests are conducted through TCP/IP interfaces 
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to the control system protocols – for instance, forcing a 
collapse of the power system by triggering firmware faults in 
voltage relays immediately after unusual levels of solar 
activity.  The intention is not to disrupt operations but to 
conduct a weapons test in such a way that the true nature of 
the intrusion is masked by a secondary event. 
 
The implications of this form of attack on national security 
are immense – the activation of poisoned firmware might be 
triggered in a random and distributed fashion to undermine 
confidence as in the second scenario.  Again forensics would 
be hard because of the proprietary nature of SCADA Devices 
in APOCs and the present tendency simply to rip and replace 
failed devices rather than conduct lengthy code debugging 
cycles.  A more malicious alternative would be to trigger the 
code during the escalation of physical attacks, as was seen 
during the Russian conflict in Ossetia [11]. 
 
7. Mitigations 
These scenarios are based on previous incidents that have 
affected other industries.  They can be criticised because they 
focus on the particular impact for TAM but they stem from 
more general methods of attack.   However, they are justified 
because each one is grounded in evidence from previous 
occurrences and it seems unreasonable to assume that aviation 
will be immune from the troubles that have affected other 
industries.  In some cases, we can address these concerns by 
transferring lessons from other domains.  For example, there 
is a clear need from all three scenarios to ensure that 
engineers have the forensic evidence necessary to identify and 
diagnose potential attacks.   There are, unfortunately, 
particular challenges in re-using the lessons of other 
industries.  For instance, many of the APOC/TAM concepts 
have not considered process and resource profiling, the 
importance of authentication and access control, the need to 
train staff to distinguish between ‘normal’ degraded modes 
and cyber incidents or provided means of preserving the chain 
of evidence.   It is important to reiterate that the aim of these 
vignettes is not to conduct an exhaustive risk assessment 
given the huge differences in APOC architectures and the 
evolving nature of APOC services – however, these scenarios 
are important because they provide a focus for discussion and 
help to ensure that cyber-threats are considered when 
stakeholders work with project sponsors to refine the high 
level concepts that were introduced at the start of this paper.    
It is important to stress that the examples in this paper are a 
subset of the concerns that have guided our work and from 
them we identify the following mitigations that seem essential 
for the future integrity of APOC/TAM implementations: 
• Supply chain management – APOCs are specifically 
intended to bring together groups of stakeholders 
who previously operated isolated systems.   This 
integration unifies many different supply chains; the 
subcontractors and suppliers vary enormously in 
terms of their cyber maturity. 
• Resource profiling – even new APOCs integrate 
many different legacy systems.  The operators often 
lack the intellectual property rights to access process 
and memory structures for those systems hence it 
can be hard to support intrusion detection.    
• Incident reporting – if we cannot yet accurately 
profile all of the admissible processes in our 
network, we might support APOC intrusion 
detection by identifying malware using information 
about previous attacks.  This depends on sharing 
attack signatures especially between APOCs that 
operate similar, specialist applications not covered 
by existing security firms. 
• Forensic support – all of the scenarios raise 
questions about the evidence that can be obtained in 
the aftermath of a suspect intrusion.   TAM requires 
that stakeholders consider whether they have enough 
data logged to identify the causes and extent of an 
intrusion. 
• Regulatory interfaces – many APOC services are 
safety related.  In consequence, operators need to 
know whether they should immediately halt 
operation when an incident is detected.  This would 
have a huge impact on availability given the clear 
possibility of false alarms.  Regulatory support is 
also required to determine when it is safe to resume 
operation given the persistent threat are deliberately 
hard to identify. 
• CERT assistance – it is likely that a European-wide 
aviation Computer Emergency Response Team will 
be developed.   The future integrity of TAM 
implementations will benefit greatly from closer 
interaction between their operators and this future 
organisation. 
• KPI interaction – the APOC concept is intended to 
meet a wide range of KPIs through airport 
information system integration.  Increased levels of 
cyber-security are likely to have an impact on those 
KPIs – for example in response to false alarms 
within an intrusion detection system or through 
increased costs of supply chain management.  
Hence, some help needs to be provided to APOC 
operators when they draw up a business case to 
consider the costs and benefits of investing in cyber-
resources. 
 
As can be seen, some of the mitigations are APOC specific 
while others are more generic, however, all can influence and 
shape the emerging TAM concepts of operation. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has introduced the twin concepts of Airport 
Operations Centres (APOCs) and Total Airport Management 
(TAM).   Together, these provide a vision of greater 
efficiency, increased levels of safety and reduced 
environmental impact through collaborative decision making 
that is informed by the integration of information systems.   
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These objectives will be undermined if we cannot ensure the 
cyber security of future implementations.   This paper has 
identified a range of possible vulnerabilities and has used 
three scenarios with different actors, different levels of 
technical sophistication and different consequences on airport 
operations.   Each is based on previous attacks on other 
industries – this is important if we are to show that the threats 
are credible.  However, each scenario has been reinterpreted 
in the context of APOC operations with the aim of ensuring 
that detailed and specific cyber concerns are considered as 
TAM infrastructures move from research to deployment.   
The closing sections have identified a number of mitigations 
– some generic and other specific to airport systems.   It 
remains to be seen whether these concerns inform future 
systems or whether we are left to pick up the pieces after 
deployment. 
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